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CASE NO. 7663

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
ARCHIE POULSEN,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.
C. V. MANNESS, doing business as
Manness Construction and Appliance
Company, and UDELL WOOD,
Defendants and Appellants.

ELDON A. ELIASON, and
PRESTON D. RICHARDS,
Atto~neys

for Plaintiff

and Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
The respondent herein will refer to the parties by name
or as Plaintiff and Defendants. References to the transcript
are designated, (Tr. - .. ) References to the record· other
than the transcript are designated, (R.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages
for personal injuries and for damages to his jeep automobile
which he sustained by reason of an intersection collision
which he had with the Defendants on August 4, 1949.
1
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The Statement of Facts set out by the Defendants in their
brief is incomplete and seeks to rely on only a small portion
of the record.

Mr. Archie Poulsen, the Plaintiff, left his home in Sugarville the morning of August 4, 1949, to go to Delta. He was
driving his jeep automobile and was accompanied by his
wife, Norma Poulsen, who sat in the front seat on the right
side, and his small son, James, who sat in the front seat
between them. Archie Poulsen was going to obtain some
repair parts for equipment which he was repairing and he
had accomplished that part of his mission and was returning
to his home in Sugarville, which is a distance of approximately fourteen (14) miles from Delta, when the accident
with the Defendants occured. The Plaintiff left Delta at
approximately eleven o'clock a.m. travelling a county highway known as th Sugarville-Hinckley road, which road connects Sugarville with such town as Hinckley, Deseret and
Abraham, and connects with the Abraham road which goes
to Delta. The Plaintiff was traveling North on this Sugarville-Hinckley road at an average speed of approximately
twenty (20) to twenty-five (25) miles per hour, (Tr. 15).
He had watched his speed because of a new engine which
he had put in the jeep, (Tr. 15.)

On the same day and at the same time, which was approximately eleven-thirty o'clock a. m., the Defendant, Udell
Wood, was driving the automobile which was owned by Defendant, C. V. Manness, and Udell Wood, was driving as
an agent and employee of said C. V. Manness, (Tr. 180.)
Approximately four miles South of Sugarville, the Sugar2
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ville-Hinckley road intersects with a road known as the
Topaz Road. This road received its name from being the
road out to the now abandoned Topaz Japanese Relocation
Center.
Defendant Udell Wood, and one Bud Barker in the employ of C. V. Manness, were traveling this Topaz road in
Defendant C. V. M~mness' Oldsmobile at the time of the accident. going West.
Both the Topaz road and. the Sugarville--Hinckley road
are county maintained roads and at the point of the intersection, the Sugarville-Hinckley road is approximately sixty
(60) feet wide and twenty-four (24) feet wide across the
travel portion which was graded and graveled. The Topaz
road is approximately sixty (60) feet wide and twenty (20)
feet wide across the oiled surfaced portion, which oil had
been put on in 1945 for the Japanese camp. The road is now
used as a farm-to-market road. The Topaz road, at the place
of the intersection, had approximately a two or two and onehalf (2 or 2 1h) foot additional shoulder, graded and graveled, on each side of the oiled surface, ( Tr. 22, 41, 83, 124),
which portion was also traveled upon, and it was difficult to
tell where the oiled portion stopped as the gravel covered
over part of it and the traffic used it as a regular part of
the road. For all practical purposes, the Topaz road runs
East and Y../ est and the Sugarville-Hinckley road runs North
and South and at the intersection both roads are level without any apparent grade. There was no stop sign at either
of these intersecting roads, (Tr. 134.)
On the date of the accident both roads were heavily lined
with sunflowers and other weeds. These weeds and sun-
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flowers continue along each road in each direction for several mles.
Both the Topaz road and the Sugarvlle-Hinckley road
have other intersecting roads crossing them at about ·~very
one-half (1-2) mile apart. There are about six (6) such other
roads intersecting or crossing the Topaz road in an area of
three (3) miles, (Tr. 66, 134.)

When the Plaintiff reached the intersection on his return
trip home, it was approximately eleven-thirty a. m. He approached the intersection with the Topaz road and drove his
jeep so that the front wheels were approximately three feet
from the oiled portion of the road, (Tr. 15, 22.) From this
point the front of his car extended over the traveled portion of the road which was graded and graveled and traveled, and right up to the oiled surface. From the seat in ·~he
Jeep, it was scarcely discernable where the oiled surface
stopped. But when the Plaintiff stopped his jeep, he looked
to the East, which was his right, and he could see up the
Topaz road approximately four hundred (400) feet, (Tr. 15,
52, 53, 56, 57, 69, 77). His wife also looked up the road. His
and his wife's vision farther up the road than this was obscured because of the tall weeds and sunflowers v.-hic:•
grew along the side of the road. The Plaintiff testified that
his vision of the road for four hundred ( 400) feet was clear
and that he observed no vehicles upon the road, (Tr. 69, 77.)
Mrs. Poulsen also testified that she saw no vehicle upon
the road as she looked to her right. (Tr. 111). Then Plaintiff testified that he looked to the west but could not see so
far, (Tr. 15), because the line of Sunflowers on the West
side of the intersection extended farther up against ·~he
Topaz road, because of a turn in the ditch at the intersec4
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tion. (Tr. 53, 63). He then testified that he put the ] eep in
low gear and started North until he could see the road
West, (Tr. 15, 53, 63.) He testified that when he could see
clearly to the West he again turned and looked East and
this time saw the Defendants' car coming toward them about
forty ( 40) or fifty( 50) feet away, (Tr. 15.) Plaintiff testified the Oldsmobile was traveling towards him at about seventy (70) miles per hour, (Tr. 18, 58,.) Plaintiff further
testified that he had traveled about ten feet after looking
East the first time, before he looked East the second time
and he had reached the approximate speed of between five
(5) and ten (10) miles per hour, (Tr. 60), and was nearing the center of the road. The Defendants Oldsmobile
came straight into the side of Plaintiff's jeep without attmpting to stop or reduce speed until he was about thirty
(30) to forty ( 40) feet from the jeep, (Tr. 15 18).
At the time of the impact, the Plaintiff's jeep had traveled nearly all the way across the road with the front wheels
of the jeep being very near the North side of the oiled portion of the Topaz road, (Tr. 61, 81), The Defendants Oldsmobile struck the jeep near the middle on the right side,
(Tr. 18). Witnesses, including the Deputy Sheriff, testified
that the Defendants Oldsmobile had left skid marks in the
road for a d~stance of about thirty (30) feet before point of
impact, (Tr. 124).

The force of the impact knocked the Plaintiff and the
other occupants of the jeep through the air and approximately fifty (50) feet where they landed in a ditch. The
Plaintiff was rendered unconscious by the force of ·~he
impact, (Tr. 20). The Plaintiff's jeep was knocked approx-
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imately forty ( 40) to forty-five ( 45) feet up the Topaz
road West, where it came to rest on its side, (Tr. 18 and 19).
The Defendants Oldsmobile came to a stop approximately
thirty (30) feet to the West of the point of impact, (Tr. 19
and 83).
The Plaintiff and Norma Poulsen testified that the Defendant, Udell Wood, soon after the impact, came over to
where they were lying in the ditch and attempted to put
a seat cover under Mrs. Poulsen's head in an effort to hold
it out of the water and Defendant Wood said, "Lady you are
hunt bad, My God, If I had only been watching the road
instead of looking for houses and not driving so fast ·~his
never would have happened." (Tr. 26). Again two disinterested boys testified hearing Defendant Vvood state that, "It
was all my fault that if I had been watching the road and
not driving so fast the accident wouldn't have happened."
(Tr. 97, 102, 103). He said to one of these witnesses he
was driving .seventy (70) miles per hour. (Tr. 103). The
Plaintiff testified defendant \Vood was going 70 miles per
hour, (Tr. 18). The Defendant Wood was according to his
own testimony traveling fifty (50) miles per hour as he ap·
preached the blind intersection, (Tr. 159), and he did not
look either to the right or the left as he approached the intersection, (Tr. 186). Defendant further testified that as
soon as he observed the Poulsen car it was in the intersec·
tion and he applied his brakes, but was unable to stop.
STATEMENT OF POINTS

1. THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO JUST!·
FY THE SUBMISSION TO THE JURY OF THE ISSUE
OF THE NEGLIENCE OF THE DEFENDANTS.
G
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2. THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE DEFENDANT
WOOD WAS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT
J. THE

EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED THAT THE
PLAINTIFF, ARCHIE POULSEN, WAS NOT GUILTY
OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER
OF LAW.
4. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COir!MIT ERROR
IN FAILING TO GRANT DEFENDANTS' FIRST MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT.

5. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT.

ERROR
IN FAILING TO GRANT THE DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR A NON-SUIT.
6. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT C01'vllk1IT ERROR
IN FAILING TO GRANT DEFENDANTS' SECOND
lr!OTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT.

7. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMlviiT ERROR
IN OVERRULING THE DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
A ]UDG1vlENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT.
B. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMI1 _ 'ERROR

IN OVERRULING THE
FOR A NE~V TRIAL.

DEFENDANTS' !dOTION

ARGUEl\'IENT
1. THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO ]USTI-

7
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FY THE SUBMISSION TO THE JURY OF THE ISSUE OF THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE DEFENDANTS.
The facts in the Poulsen case including the condition
of the roads, the width of the roads, the visibility on the
roads, the visual obstruction at the intersection, the speed
of the automobiles, the ability to observe each other, the
failure to .stop or yield the right of way by the Defendant,
the failure of the Defendant to keep a proper look-out, are
all very carefully considered and included in the opinion
in an almost identical case of Amasa Lowder and Alene S.
Lowder, Plaintiffs vs. Ruth Holley and John Holley, Defendants, which case was just recently decided by the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, and which is not yet in
the Utah reports or the Pacific Reporter but which case
is referred to in the advance sheets as Civil Case No. 7486,
Utah State Supreme Court. A unanimous decision was rendered in that case sustaining the trial court decision in favor of the Plaintiff.
In that case also the appellants attack the sufficiency of
the evidence to support the court's findings that Ruth Holley was negligant or that her negligence was the proximate
cause of the accident.

Referring now to theLowder vs. Holley case, Ruth Holley
testified she was. driving at the rate of thirty (30) miles per
hour. She admitted she did not look East of the intersection
until she was almost at the intersection, then her view was
obstructed by a pile of dirt and she couldn't see anything.
Officers who investigated that accident gave as their opinion that the Holley car was traveling at the rate of forty
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(40) to fifty (50) miles per hour.
Now let us look at the Poulsen case which shows an even
greater amount of negligence on the part of the Defendant.
If we read the record in the light most favorable to the
respondents, as we must do since the triers of the facts
found in their favor, we could well conclude that defendant Wood as he approached the intersection was driving
(70) miles per hour as testified by the Plaintiff and other
wisnesse.s (Tr. 103). The Defendant Wood himself testified
he was driving fifty (50) miles per hour as he approached
the intersection and when he first saw the Plaintiff's car it
was near the center of the intersection and he was then
forty ( 40) or fifty feet away. This is grossly more negligant
as to speed than was evident in the case of Amasa Lowder

vs. Rzzth Holley.
The evidence with regard to Defendant Vvood's failur~ to
keep a proper look-out or even observe what was directly
in front of him is even more conclusive as to the showing
of negligence of the Defendant.

Reading from the testimony of the Defendant Wood, (Tr.
186):

Q : Did you look at all to the left as you came along
Topaz road?

A: I did not.

Q : You did not. You looked at your speedometer?
A: yes.

Q: Did you look to the right of the road?
A: No.
·9
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Q: You didn't look to the right of the road either?
A: No.
Q: How fast were you driving when you saw the
jeep?
A : Fifty miles per hour.
Defendants counsel on re-direct in an attempt to get around this damaging testimony re-examined the defendant,
(Tr. 187).

Q : You stated on cross examination that you didn't
look to the South or left and you did not look
to the right as you proceeded along the Topaz
highway, answer this, please.

Q: At what time did you have in mind when you
gave those answers?
Q : Do you remember the question?
A:Yes.

Q :You were asked if you looked to the left and your
answer, I believe was no.
A: Yes.
Q : Did you look to the right, and your answer was
no.
A: Yes.
Q: What period of time did you have in mind when
you answered those questions?
A: Before seeing the jeep.
This testimony is conclusive as to defendant's negligence.
The Defendant's statement thrice given that he was driving

10
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too fast and not watching the road is further conclusive to
his negligence.

POINT 2. DEFENDANT WOOD'S NEGLIGENCE WAS
THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT.
The defendant mistakenly stated in his brief that the only alleged negligence on the part of the Defendant Wood
was a purported seventy (70) miles per hour speed. That
is not the case as is shown by the complaint in the record,
the answers to the interrogatories and particularly by the
evidence.
The Defendant was negligant in one or more of the following particulars:
1. Traveling at a speed unreasonable and dangerous under the circumstances.
2. Failure to keep a proper look-out.
3. Failure to- yield the right of way to a vehicle which
had entered the intersection and was half-way through it
when the defendant first observed it on approaching the
intersection.
4. Failure to have his car under immediate and proper
control.

5. Failure to avoid the accident after observing the position of the Plaintiff upon the road, more than half-way
11
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through the intersection.
6. Failure to see the Plaintiff's jeep until it was in the
middle of the intersection.
The triers of the fact in the case at Bar could well have
found from the testimony that the Defendant V/ ood was
traveling seventy (70) miles per hour, but fifty (50) miles
per hour, as he himself testified he was driving, would have
been unreasonable under the circumstances, it having been
shown that the road was lined with sunflowers and weeds
and that there were six intersecting roads crossing i.he
Topaz road within a distance of three miles of the accident,
(Tr. 66, 134). And it further having been shown that the
Defendant had traveled this road before, (Tr. 184).
The triers of the fact could well have found from the
positive testimony of Defendant himself that. he was not
keeping proper look-out as he appreached the intersection
and that he was further negligent in not yielding the right
of way when he saw the Poulsen car in the intersection,
more than half-way through it while the Defendant was
still approaching the intersection some forty ( 40) or fifty
(50) feet away.
It is uncontridicted that there were no stop signs on either of these intersecting roads, (Tr. 134), and that the Defendant was under just as much duty to observe reasonable
care as was the Plaintiff. Had the Defendant been using
one small part of the precaution and care which the Plaintiff used in crossing the intersection the accident would
not have happened. It was shown beyond any question that
the Defendant was traveling at a rate of speed more than
12
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~even (7) times the speed of the Plaintiff and that excessive
speed together with his failure to look and his failure to
yield the right of way was the proximate cause of the accident.

"The general requirements with reference to speed
and control in the operation of automobiles apply
to drivers approaching or entering street or highway
crossings or intersections, so that, irrespective of
statute, it is the duty of such a driver in the exercise
of ordinary care, on approaching or traversing a
street crossing, to operate his car at a rate of speed
which is lawful and reasonable under the circumstances, and to have it under such control that he
may stop it so as to avoid obstructions or objects
crossing his path; the question of what, within this
rule, is an improper rate of speed and whether the
motorist retained the requisite control of the car
being one of fact." Sec. 1030, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice, Blashfield, Vol. 2.
The matter of care required of motorists under circumstances of this kind is discussed in American Jurisprudence,
Volume 5, Page 597, wherein it states:
Although automobiles are comparatively recent in
use, there is nothing novel in the principles of law
to be applied with respect to travel in them on the
highways. It is a well established principle of law,
even in the absence of statutory requirements, that
the operator of a motor vehicle must exercise ordinary, reasonable, or due care - - that is, that degree
of care and caution which an ordinarily careful and
prudent person would exercise under the same or
similar circumstances. Negligence is failure to exercise reasonable care - - that is, the care which the
ordinary, reasonable man would use under the circumstances. Obviously, ti1e care required of a motorist is controlled bv, and depends upon, the place,
circumstances. conditions, and surroundings. There
is no arbitrary or fixed rule. A statute or ordinance
,_

-~

-
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which, without regard to care or negligence or the
violat10n o£ spec1uc regulat10ns, unaertakes to forbid the runmng of an automoblle so as to inflict
aamage or InJUry, or, more spec1hcauy, so as to coJ.lide w1th other Vt!hlcles or with persons, in unconstitutional in that it is unreasonable and oppressive.
There are two divergent theories upon the question
of defining the measure of care which 1s requ1reci
to obviate the charge of negligence. According to
one theory, care is divided Into three degrees: (1)
Slight care, (2) ordinary care, and (3) extraordinary
care. According to the other theory, the care which
must be exercised to avoid the charge of negligence
is always ordinary care - - that is, the care which
ordinarily prudent persons exercise in the same or
similar circumstances. The care which ordinarly prudent persons exercise in the same or similar circumtances. The care which ordinarily prudent persons
thus exercise obviously depends upon the circumstances. For example, an ordinarily prudent person
driving through a street in which children are playing would drive slower and have his car under better control than he would when driving through a
street which was to all appearances clear or in which
only adults were seen .. The one theory would characterize the care exercised in driving through a
street in which children were playing as extraordin·
ary care. The other would characterize such care as
ordinary care under the circumstances.. The latter
theory has been adopted in the discussion herein ..

Duty to Keep Car Under Contro.J. It is a general
rule of law that part of the duty of an operator of
a motor vehicle is to keep his machine always under
control so as to avoid collision with vehicles, pedestrians, and other persons properly using the highway. 1 L. R. A. (N.S.) 227.
It is a well established rule that the o;Jera~or of
a motor vheicle must keep a reasonably careful lookout so that he may be able to avoid collisions with
persons or vehicles upon the highway. 134 P 941
is A.- L. R. 667.

Duty to Anticipate Presence of Others. It is a gener14
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al rule of law that an operator of a motor vehicle
has no right to assume that the road is clear, but
that under virtually all circumstances and at all
times, he must be reasonably vigilant and must anticipate and expect the presence of others. Zarzana v.
Neve Drug Co., 180 Cal. 32 179 P. 203, 15 A. L. R. 401.
POINT III

THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED THAT THE PLAINTIFF, ARCHIE POULSEN, WAS NOT GUILTY OF
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF
LA~V.

In the recent case of Amasa Lowder vs. Ruth Holley,
above referred to , the appellants argue that Amasa Lowder's contributing negligence precluded him from any recoverage from damage and injury. They argue Lowder failed to look and see Ruth Holley's truck before he entered
the intersection and had he looked he would have seen
the truck and it would have been his duty to refrain from
entering the intersection until he could do so safely. In this
case the able opinion written by Justice Wade, and Chief
Justice Wolf's learned concurring opinion has definitely
clarified the law in intersection accidents.
Justice Wade in his opinion says, "Appellants
strenuously argue that respondent Amasa Lowder's
contributory negligence precludes both him and his
wife from any recovery for damages and iniuries.
They argue that he failed to look and see Ruth Holley's truck before he entered the intersection and
had he looked he would have s~en the truck and it
would have been his duty to refrain from entering
the intersection until he could do so safely. Appellants are correct in stating that before entering an
intersection the driver of a car must look and deter-
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mine whether it is safe to enter. However, under the
facts as the court found them, had Amasa Lowder
observed the truck just before he entered the intersection he would have been justified in considering
it safe to enter because at that point, if the truck was
being driven at the rate of 50 miles per hour, and
Amatla Lowder was driving at from 5 to 10 miles per
hour, as the trier of the facts could reasonably have
found, then the truck would have been at least 250
feet from th intersection since his car he~d tr-aveled
almost the entire distance across the inter~~~tion before the impact. and this being so he could h;tve assumed and acten on the assumn+;o., that +h"! nriver of
the truck would exercise .ordinarv a,rl reaso,ab1e
care in its driving- and that it would be safe to
croc;s the intersection. H::~rl Rnth Ho11:>v expr~ic;ed
such reasonable and orrlin~rv care the comc;io,
would not have occurred. Under such a state of fact~
Amasa Lowder's failure to see the truck ro11ld in no
way have contributed to the acciil.ent. The ('n,,rt,
therefore. did :rot err in finding that Amasa Lowder was not contributorily negligent."
Chief Justice Wolfe says in his concurring opinion, "As the Plaintiff approached the intersection,
he looked in both directions, shifted into second gear
and proceeded across at 5 to 10 miles per hour. Plaintiff had gone about two-thirds of the way across the
intersection so that the front of his car had reached
the fence line on the west side of the north-south
road, upon which defendant was approaching from
the north, when Plaintiff's car was struck in the
right rear by defendant's truck. The investigating
officer estimated that the defendant was traveling
between 40 and 50 miles per hour, basing his opinion
upon defendant's skid marks and the damage to both
automobiles. Thus, the deefndant was traveling approximately seven times faster than the plaintiff.
Evidence concerning the presence of a dirt pile and
an orchard which affected visibility was considered
by the trial judge, sitting as the fact finder. Judgment was rendered for the plaintiff."
"I believe the judgment should be affirmed be16
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cause the great disparity in speed between these
two automobiles places this case in the Hess V.
Robinson, 109 Utah 60, 163 P. 2D 510 category rather than that of Bullock v. Luke, 98 Utah 501, 98 P.2d
350. Although the road defendant was traveling is a
better road permitting greater speed, there was no
stop sign at this intersection. Both roads are gravel.
Whether the plaintiff upon entering the intersection should have observed the defendant's car, which
could have been some 250 feet away, or if upon discovering it plaintiff reasonably could have assumed
that he had the right of way and that the defendant would slow up and let him across are all questions of fact. Reasonable minds can and certainly do
differ in such a situation as this. I cannot say there
was error in the fact finder's conclusions."
In the case at bar, Plaintiff Archie Poulsen testified that
he stopped his jeep with the front wheels approximately
three (3) feet from the oiled portion of the Topaz road, (Tr.
15). This \vould have left the front of his vehicle extending onto about two and one-half (2 1-2) feet of graveled
road which was a traveled portion of the highway. Loaded
ore trucks were frequently coming from the west, (Tr. 15,
53, 5'), and visibility to the west was more obstructed than
was the visibility to the east because or the sunflowers extending out nearer to the road on the west side of the intersection because of the turn in the ditch at the intersection,
(Tr .. 53, 57). The Plaintiff had driven as far into the intersection as it was reasonably safe to drive before stopping the
jeep. From this point he testified that he could see east along the Topaz road a distance of about four hundred ( 400)
feet, (Tr. 15, 18, 53), and that he did not observe any traffic
upon the highway in that 400 foot area. The Plaintiff testified he then loo!~ed \Vest, put the jeep in gear and drove
the jeep ahead so he could see up the road to the left or to
the \Vest and observe there was no traffic coming, he turned
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and looked East again and saw the defendants car coming
toward him at a terrific rate of speed estimated by him at
seventy (70) miles per hour equivalent to 102 feet per second. Mrs. Poulsen testified that she looked east when ·~hey
stopped at the Topaz road and that she observed no 'traffic,
(Tr. 111).
The only recognizable difference in the facts in the Lowder vs. Holley case from the Poulsen case is that Lowder
drove through the intersection without stopping to observe
the traffic to the right and left and Poulsen being more
cautious drove until the front wheels of his jeep were within a few feet of the oil and the front of his car actually
extending out into the traveled portion of the road, then
stopped and according to the undisputed testimony looked
to the east then to the west before proceeding.
Certainly such additional caution tends to strengthen the
Poulsen case. And how could anyone be found to say that
with the Plaintiff exercising all these precautions that his
conduct was so negligent that there was no room for doubt
in the minds of reasonable men.
Appellant seeks to color the facts by making it appear a
negligent act for the Plaintiff to ride in a green jeep with
a brown top. Can it be that the defendant Wood was so
negligent and reckless in his observation that he could not
distinguish a green jeep with a brown top from a clump
of sunflowers?
When the Plaintiff stopped his car on the edge of the
Topaz road there was not a blanket wall of sunflowers extending up in front of his windshield as the appellants
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would suppose. There were no sunflowers to his right for
fifteen feet and then their height and thickness naturally
varied so that it is only natural that the Plaintiff coming
to the edge of the Topaz road could see past the edge of the
sunflowers for several hundred feet up the road and the
Plaintiff testified he could see up the road to a certain
telephone pole which he estimated to be and later measured
to find it a distance of approximately four hundred ( 400)
feet.

The time element corresponds exactly with this testimony.
After stopping and looking in each direction then putting
the jeep in low gear and cautiously moving ahead so he
could see further up the road to the West from which .direction the loaded ore trucks came until he had traveled at an
average speed of three (3) to five (5) miles per hour, a
distance of approximately ten (10) feet, it is reasonable that
five to eight seconds had been consumed and defendant had
traveled at least five hundred (500) feet or more. Therefore, the defendants car must have been at least five hundred (500) feet away when plaintiff stopped before crossing
the intersection. His reason then for not seeing the defendants car was that it was not within range of vision.
It is impossible to conceive how the plaintiff could have
been more careful and observing than he was. His precautions and care were greater than that of a reasonable man.
They were much greater than that of Amasa Lowder. The
plaintiff would have to have left his jeep and walked out
in front of it to have shown more care, then by the time he
returned to the drivers seat someone like the defendant driving at an unreasonable speed would have still come so far
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that if Plaintiff could not have relied on the other driver
to use reasonable care he could never cross.
The court in the Lowder case held that Plaintiff was proceeding with due care in crossing when he could see up the
road 250 feet from intersection. .In the case of Ward vs.
Gildee, 186 P. 612 the court held that the statute giving the
driver on the right, the right of way was inapplicable where
such driver was 145 feet from intersection when the first
driver entered, and that the latter had the clear right to
make the first crossing.

The Defendants argument that the Plaintiff Archie Poulsen, was contributorily negligent as a matter of law is based upon a premise that is not supported by the evidence.
That is, that the Plaintiff, Archie Poulsen, could have seen
the defendant's automobile but failed to look.The plain facts
are that the defendant's car was not within range of vision
when Plaintiff looked. The defendant cites for authority,
the following cases: Bullock vs. Luke, 98 P.2d 350, Conklin
vs. Wal.sh, 193 P. 2d 437, Gren vs. No·rton, 215 P. 356, Hickock vs. Skinner, 190 P. 2d 514, Minqus vs. Olso·n, 201 P. 2d
495, Delsman vs. Bertotti, a State of Washington case, 93
P. 2d 371.

These cases are sound for the principle they involve, but
it is immediately clear to the reader that these cases cited by
the defendant in their brief are not applicable to the facts
in this case. In Bullock vs. Luke the court found that the
driver of the vehicle was negligent in not seeing the car
which hit him when he had an unobstructed view for a distance of from two hundred (200) to eight hundred (800)
·.20
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feet varying inversely with his proximity to the intersection. The case presumes that the other vehicle was within
the driver's vision and could have been seen had the driver
looked.

In the case Conklin vs. J.Valsh the fact situation is entirely unrelated to the facts in the case at bar. There the
truck driver going thirty (30) miles to forty-five ( 45) miles
per hour observed the approaching car a quarter of a block
before he reached the intersection and knew it was coming
but failed to look again when a mere- glance would have
revealed the Conklin car.

The case of Gren vs. Norton 213 P. 2d 356 only remotely
bares upon the present case. In that case the Plaintiff drove
across an arterial highway where his view of oncoming
traffic was unobstructed for more than a mile. He drove
through safety zone in the center of the road, and a distance
of more than 108 feet into the path of the oncoming truck,
apparently obliviously to the truck which was sounding
its horn in an effort to cause the plaintiff to stop in the
safety zone in the center of the street which he could have
reasonably done, and which he reasonably would have been
expected to do.
The case of Hie/rock vs. Skinner is not like the present
case because there the plaintiff twenty feet back of the
intersection actually saw the defendant's car approaching a
distance of four hundred (400) to five hundred (500) feet
away .. Then he drove sixty-five (65) feet into the intersection without again looking at the oncoming car. The court
said in that case: "Neither (driver) should be permitted to
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close his eyes to the other vehicles which he knov.rs or has
reason to to believe are approaching simply because a state
statute or a municipal ordinance designates him the preferred driver." The Plaintiff in that case drove some sixtyfive (65} feet crossing an arterial highway without ever
again looking in the direction where he had first observed
a vehicle coming toward him.
In the case of Delsman vs. Bertotti, a State of \Vashington Case, the court held that the plaintiff could not see the
entire width of the street looking through a gap in the
hedge and that he did not make a reasonable observation
and his failure to make observation constituted contributory
negligence.

The case of Mingus vs. Olson, 201 P. 2d 495, is not in
point as it involves two pedestrians who admittedly failed
to look for traffic as they crossed a street usualy heavy with
traffic and the court properly disallowed recovery.

In the case of Demcerb vs. Pawtucke·t Cabinet :md Builders Finishing Company, Incorporated, 193 A 622 RI 451,
cited by the defendants in their brief the facts are again unrelated in that before Plaintiff started across intersection or
School street he observed the defendants truck twenty-five
(25) or thirty (30} feet away and hadn't entered the intersection when he so observed it. The court held that an ordinary prudent person would not have acted as did the plaintiff but further held that the question of contributory negligence is ordinarly one for the jury unless it clearly appears
that the only proper conclusion from the undisputed facts
is that in the circumstances of the case a person of ordinary
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prudence would have not acted as did the plaintiff.
Again the case of Musten vs. West, cited by the defendant, 46 So. 2d 136, bares little or no similarity to the case
at bar, because in that case the plaintiff's car proceeded
without stopping into a street designated "Stop" by city
ordinance, and then without ever looking, the driver traveled to or past the center of the intersection when she was
struck broad side by the defendant West's automobile which
had approached and entered the intersection on the favored
street at a speed in excess of the maximum fixed by the
city ordinance. The proceeding through the stop sign and
the failure to make any reasonable observance in that case
was a bar to recovery.
The defendant also cites the case of Epps vs. Standard
Supply and Hardware Company, 4 So. 2d 790, again there
is little or no similarity of this case to the Poulsen vs. Manness case or the Lowder vs. Holley case. Epps said he only
looked fifty feet up the street when the evidence shows he
could have seen a considerable distanc £arthur as there was
nothing to obstruct his view.
In Carey vs. DeRose, 288 No. W 165, the court merely
held as did the Utah court in Bullock vs. Luke, that a person
was required to see that which was plainly visible when
he had an unobstructed view.

The case at bar comes very definitely in the category oi
Hess vs. Robison, 163 P. 2d 510, which was decided by the
Utah Supreme Court in an very similar fact situation
as the case at bar. In this case plaintiff was driving at fif23
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teen miles per hour southward on Grant Avenue, describeJ
as a "through street", "stop street", or arterial highway.
Defendants were driving their ambulance eastward on Thirty-first Street at a speed variously estimated by the witnesses at from twenty-five to fifty miles per hour as it approached the intersection .. The point of collision was about
three (3) feet VI est of the center point of the intersection.
The plaintiff admittedly failed to look to the right on approaching the intersection and the defendant failed to observe the stop sign and the court held both parties negligent at matter of law but submitted to the jury the question
of whether Plaintiff's negligence was a proximate cause of
the accident.

The Supreme Court of Utah said in that case:

For the plaintiff's negligence to be a defense for
the defendant, it must not only exist at the same
time and place as conditions created or the forces
put in operation by the negligence of defendants, but
it must set in operation a force, or create a condition,
which had a share in producing the injury. Proximate cause of an injury means that the injury was
the natural and probable consequence which a person of ordinary foresight and prudence would have
anticipated. Arkansas Valley Trust Company vs.
Mcilroy, 97 Ark. 160 133 S. W. 816, 31 LR. A., N. S.
1020. To be proximate cause of an injury it must be
an efficient act of causation and separated from its
effect by no other act of causation. There must be
a causal connection between the act or omission and
subsequent injury.
As to what the circumstances were at the time
plaintiff entered the intersection, as to whether entering under such circumstances was an act from
which a person of ordinary prudence and caution
would have foreseen that some injury would likely
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result, are matters upon which reasonable minds
may differ. As such they are properly for the jury.
Proximate cause and contributory negligence are
ordinarily questions of fact for the jury to determine under all the circumstances.. Great N. R. Co.
v. Thompson, 9 Cir., 199 F. 395, 118 C. C. A. 79, 47
L. R.-A. N. S., 506; Hales v. Michigan Cent. R. Co., 6
Cir., 200 F. 533, 118 C. C. A. 627. Questions of negligence do not become questions of law for the court
except where the facts are such that all reasonable
men draw the same conclusions. Baltimo·re & Ohio
R. Co. v. Taylor, 4 Cir., 186 F. 828. 109 C. C. A. 172;
O,Donnel v. Riter-Conley Mfg. Co·., 172 Ill. App.
601; Heckman v. Evenson, 7 N. D. 173, 73 N. W. 427.
Since in this case there is a question as to what
were the circumstances existing when plaintiff en~
tered the intersection. and where those circumstances may be found bv the trie,. of the fact to he ~uch
that reasonable men miP."ht differ as to whether plaintiff's conduct in enterin~ the intersection was such
as an ordinarily prudent and careful man might do
under the circumstances. there was a question for
the iurv as to whether plaintiff's negligence was con+-ributory, that is, was a proximate cause .of the injury.
It follows that the judgment should be and is
affirmed. Costs to respendent.
In the case at Bar Poulsen's conduct showed much more
care than did Robison in the case above quoted.
In the case of Nielson vs. Manchley 202 Pacific
2nd 547 decided by the Supreme Court of Utah in
February, 1949-. that court reversed the lower Court
which had held that the Plaintiff was contributorily
negligent as a matter of law. In that case a school
bus was being backed out of defendants yard into
the street. Plaintiff using the street saw the bus
backing out three hundred (300) feet away but continued his speed at twenty-five (25) miles per hour
till he reached within 116 of the bus and applied his
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brakes but the icy road prevented his stopping and
he hit the bus. The Supreme Court held the Lower
Court erred in holding Plaintiff was negligent as
a matter of law and said the question of the Plaintiff's contributory negligence should have been left
to the jury.
The matter of contributory negligence as constituting
proximate cause of an accident is discussed in American
Jurisprudence, Volume 5, Page 744, in the following language:

It is essential that the acts complained of as constituting contributory negligence contribute directly and proximately to the accident. Contributory
negligence in violating a statute by driving on the
wrong side of the road, must,in order to defeat recovery, have been the proximate cause of the injury.
The mere occurrence of an act of negligence on the
part of the person instituting the action will not, of
itself, preclude recovery, unless the surrounding circumstances establish such act as the direct cause of
the accident reulting in the injuries complained of.
Thus, the defense of contributory negligence will
fail where the relationship of the fault with respect
to the accident as a proximate and contributory cause
is not a necessary inference under the circumstances.
Quoting further from Volume 5 of American Jurisprudence Page 745, the rule is stated as follows:
When the facts relating to contributory neglie:ence are of such a character that reasonable minds
~ight reach different conclusions thereon, a question of fact is presented for the determination of
the jury. Keir vs. Trager, 7 P. (2D) 49, 81 A. L. R.
181.
The triers of the fact were justified in finding from the
evidence that there was no contributory negligence whatso-
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ever on the part of the Plaintiff Poulsen and that they could
well have found all of his actions measured up to the care
required of a reasonably prudent man under the circumstances. It appears clear and definite that the care, the caution, and the observances of the safety shown by the Plaintiff was greater than that shown by the Plaintiffs in the case of Robinson vs. Hess, 163 P. 2d 510, Nielson
vs. JI,Janchley, 202 Pac. 2547 and Lowder vs. Holley, Utah
Advance Sheet 7486, all of which cases have recently been
decided by the Utah Supreme Court and it is contended
that Poulsen vs. Manness, et. al., comes clearly within this
class of cases.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the evidence in the record supports the verdict of the jury as rendered in the trial
court. This court has held on numerous occasions that the
record must be read in the light most favorable to the respondents when the triers of the fact have found in their
favor.
American Jurisprudence Volume 39, Page 1045, gives the
positive statement of the law concerning the right of the
jury to pass upon questions of liability in the following
words:
The right of a party in a negligence action to
have the jury pass upon the question of liability
becomes absolute where the facts are in dispute and
the evidence is conflicting, or when the proof discloses such a state of facts, whether controverted or
not, that, in essaying to fix responsibility for the injury or damage, different minds may arrive reasonably at different conclusions or may disagree reasl._

27

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

onably as to the inferences to be drawn from the
facts. Thus, where there is a direct conflict of testimony upon a matter of fact, the question must be
left to the jury to determine, without regard to the
number of witnesses upon either side or the character of the testimony.
In the further case of Sine vs. Salt Lake Transportation
Company (Utah 1944) 147 P (2) 875, a case involving an
automobile collision, the Utah Supreme Court said:

This is a case at law. It therefore follows that this
appeal is upon questions of law alone. That being
true ·the function of this court is not to pass upon
the weight of the evidence, nor to determine conflicts therein but to examine it solely for the purposes of determining whether or not the judgment
finds substantial support in the evidence. In so examining the evidence all reasonable presumptions
are in favor of the trial court's findings and judgment, and the evidence must be considered in the
light most favorable to them. If the findings and
judgment are substantially supported by the evidence, then the court may not disturb them.
It is earnestly contended that no reasaon has been shown
from the evidence in this case which would justify the
court in taking the case from the jury and that the evidence clearly supports the verdict rendered and the rulings
of the trial court.
Respectfully submitted,
ELDON ELIASON, and
PRESTON D. RICHARDS,
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and

Respondents.
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